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I. INTRODUCTION
The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predeces-
sors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the
giant himself.1
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that
the Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing the limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries."2 This provision forms the basis of federal copyright law, codi-
fied in Title 17 of the United States Code.3
The Copyright Act gives the owner of a valid copyright the exclu-
sive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display the
work.4 The Act defines a copyright infringer in part as "[a]nyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner."5 Congress
recognized, however, that giving the author of a copyrighted work ab-
solute control over the reproduction of the work would stifle creativity.
Thus, it allowed for others to use copyrighted work for a "fair use"
without subjecting the user to liability. Section 107 of the Copyright
Act provides a non-exclusive list of fair use factors:
1. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 511 (1945).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 17 U.S.C. 88 101-3300 (1998) [hereinafter "Copyright Act" or "the Act"].
4. Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of a copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1998).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1998).
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
6
The fair use doctrine thus seeks to reconcile the interest of the artist
in protecting his or her creative work with the public's interest in ac-
cess to such creative work.
Technology has had an obvious impact on copyright law. Congress
has frequently found itself in a reactionary position as advances in
technology have necessitated change.7 With the development and ex-
panded use of the Internet over the past decade, new and even more
complex copyright issues have arisen. Congress addressed these is-
sues in part with the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.8 However, Congress has not fully delineated the scope of copy-
right protection in cyberspace; thus, the fair use doctrine and other
traditional copyright principles will play an important role in the reso-
lution of these issues.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,9 serves as an important
source of guidance in this unchartered area of the law. Napster
"touches upon the gray area of copyright law that tries to strike a bal-
ance between protecting intellectual property in cyberspace while
shielding Internet Service Providers... from liability for the unautho-
rized actions of their users."1 0 In Napster, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California held that users of Nap-
ster, a service provider which facilitated the transfer of MP3 music
files, likely committed copyright infringement when they uploaded
and downloaded copyrighted music files, and that Napster could be
held liable for contributory infringement based on its users' actions.
Accordingly, the court granted a preliminary injunction against Nap-
ster, requiring it to take steps to prevent infringement from occur-
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1998).
7. For example, the printing press created the need for copyright protection. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (not-
ing that copyright protection became necessary after the invention of the printing
press and had its beginnings in British censorship laws). The development of the
audio tape recorder led to the passage of the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. Simi-
larly, the Audio Home Recording Act became necessary after the expanded use of
digital audio technology. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
8. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in various sections of Title 17 of the United States Code).
9. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
10. Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window Onto the Future of Copyright Law
in the Internet Age, 18 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER & IMo. L. 755, 757 (2000).
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ring."1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the district court's
ruling relevant to this Note.12 As of this writing, Napster has not ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Thus, this Note focuses specifically on the question of whether it
was proper to deny Napster users fair use protection and to hold Nap-
ster liable for its users' actions. Part II of the Note explains the Nap-
ster system and gives a factual background of the case. Part III gives
a brief legal background of the doctrines involved in resolving the is-
sues presented in the case. Part IV concludes that the district court
was correct in holding that Napster users were not engaged in a fair
use because the uploading and downloading of MP3 files is not the
type of personal use meant to be protected under the doctrine, as the
widespread distribution of MP3 files stifles the market for the copy-
right holders' work. Part IV also concludes that it was proper to hold
Napster contributorily liable for the infringement of its users because
Napster knew that its users were likely to commit infringement, yet it
still offered its service.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Before explaining how Napster worked, it is necessary to explain
the situation present before Napster. Music in compact disc form is a
collection of computer data files with "wav" extensions. Each "wav"
file represents a separate musical selection. 13 Users can "rip" the
"wav" from compact discs and store them on computer hard drives.14
Because "wav" files are so large, however, the transmission of music
over the Internet initially was not feasible.15
This changed with the development of the MP3 file format. Devel-
oped by the Moving Pictures Experts Group, the MP3 compression
algorithm greatly reduced the amount of space necessary to download
11. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
12. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). While the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the substantive conclusions reached by the district
court, it believed the preliminary injunction issued by the district court was too
broad. Therefore, it remanded to the district court for modification of the prelimi-
nary injunction. See id. at 1029. On March 5, 2001 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California entered the modified preliminary
injunction. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183MHP, 2001
Lexis 2186 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2001). Because this Note is concerned only with
the substantive issues presented in Napster, the terms of the injunction will not
be discussed in any detail.
13. See Charles L. Simmons, Jr., Digital Distribution of Entertainment Content...
The Battle Lines Are Drawn, 33 AUG. MD. B.J. 31, 33 (2000).
14. See id.
15. See Berschadsky, supra note 10, at 758 ("Downloading a five-minute song could
easily take several hours given the characteristics of telephone lines, which lim-
ited most Internet connections to a speed of 56,000 bauds per second.").
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music files, therefore reducing the time necessary to download.' 6 Be-
cause MP3 files could be transferred quickly over the Internet, and
copied and distributed without losing their near-compact disc sound
quality, the MP3 file became the standard format for downloading mu-
sic. 1 7 While MP3 technology made downloading easy, users still could
not quickly locate specific MP3 files on the Internet. That, in essence,
was the genius of Napster.
Napster essentially allowed users to share these MP3 files. A user
who wished to employ the Napster service had to first download its
free "MusicShare" software.1S The user could then log on to Napster
to access, through Napster's server, a directory and index of all the
MP3 files on the hard drives of other users who were currently logged
into the system.' 9 When a user chose a file, the Napster server com-
municated with the MusicShare program of the host user to make the
file available for download.20 The fie was then transferred over the
Internet. At the time of suit, Napster users could obtain these files
free of charge.2 ' While Napster never advertised its product,
22 mil-
lions of people were using the service at the time of suit.23 The over-
whelming majority of the music available on Napster was
copyrighted. 2 4 Napster never obtained licenses to distribute the copy-
righted music.2 5
The implications of Napster go well beyond the sharing of MP3 mu-
sic files. The Napster technology helped launch a new programming
movement involving peer-to-peer sharing. Venture capitalists, as well
as established companies such as Intel, have thrown their financial
weight behind peer-to-peer start-ups.2 6 Miko Matsumura, the CEO of
Kalepa Networks (a start-up which plans to link peer-to-peer net-
works and create an Internet alternative) stated, "[the old days were
all about centralization and control.... In this new topology, everyone
16. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that MP3 technology reduced disk
space required to download "to about 3 million bytes which can be transferred
over a 56 kb [(56,000 bauds per second)] modem in a matter of minutes").
17. See Berschadsky, supra note 10, at 759.
18. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
19. See id. at 905.
20. See id. at 905-06.
21. See id. at 901.
22. See id. at 902.
23. See id. (estimating that over 75 million people would be using Napster by the end
of 2000).
24. "Eighty-seven percent of the files sampled by plaintiffs' expert... 'belong to or
are administered by plaintiffs or other copyright holders.'" Id. at 903 (citation
omitted).
25. See id.
26. See Fred Vogelstein et al., Who Says the PC is Dead?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 4, 2000, at 40.
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brings their own resources. The new network will be built on top of
the old network. Like Rome was built in different layers."27
The Recording Industry of America was not so pleased. On Decem-
ber 6, 1999, it filed suit against Napster in United States District
Court for the Northern District of California alleging contributory fed-
eral copyright infringement and similar state law violations.28
While the Copyright Act does not expressly allow for a cause of
action based on contributory infringement, courts have long recog-
nized that such a cause of action exists.29 A contributory infringer is
"one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."30
To succeed on a contributory infringement claim, the plaintiff must
first show direct infringement by a third party. Napster, however, as-
serted that its users were engaged in a fair use. To support its pro-
position, Napster relied on established case law, which stated that
"individual[s] may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the
copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use."3 1
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia declined to classify the uploading and downloading of musical
recordings as a fair use. The court noted that the downloading of MP3
files was not a traditional private use,3 2 the copyrighted music was
creative in nature,33 the copyrighted work was copied in its entirety,34
27. Karl Taro Greenfield et al., Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60, 64.
28. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). It
should be noted that the plaintiffs also asserted a claim for vicarious infringe-
ment against Napster. However, given that the doctrines of contributory and vi-
carious liability are often confused in the copyright context, see, e.g., Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (using the terms
interchangeably), and that the substantive defenses presented by Napster are
most relevant to contributory infringement, see discussion infra Parts III.A, III.C,
this Note focuses specifically on contributory infringement.
29. In Sony, the Supreme Court stated, "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all
areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species
of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold
one individual accountable for the actions of another." 464 U.S. at 435.
30. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
31. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433.
32. "[G]iven the vast scale of Napster use among anonymous individuals, the court
finds that downloading and uploading MP3 music files with the assistance of
Napster are not private uses." Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
33. "The court finds that the copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings
are creative in nature; they constitute entertainment, which cuts against a find-
ing of fair use under the second factor." Id.
34. "[It is undisputed that downloading or uploading MP3 music files involves copy-
ing the entirety of the copyrighted work." Id.
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and the market for the copyrighted work was adversely affected by
Napster use.
35
Napster further argued that the staple article of commerce doc-
trine applied to Napster use. Under this doctrine, the manufacturer of
a staple article of commerce is absolved from liability for contributory
infringement where the product is "capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses."36 Napster asserted that sampling, space-shifting (down-
loading songs from compact discs which the user already owns so that
they may be accessed through the computer), and the authorized dis-
tribution of works were fair uses for the service. 37 The court declined
to apply the doctrine, noting that any noninfringing use of the service
was commercially insignificant,38 and that Napster exercised control
over the service.
39
The court next held that it could impose contributory liability be-
cause Napster had both knowledge of the infinging activity and mate-
rially contributed to the infringement.4 0 In holding that Napster
satisfied the knowledge requirement, the court relied on evidence that
Napster executives actually knew about the transfer of illegal MP3
files, 41 and that, even in the absence of actual knowledge of specific
acts of infringement, general knowledge that the Napster service
would likely be used for infringing activity was sufficient. 42 The court
also held that Napster materially contributed to the infringing activ-
35. This point was vigorously disputed by the parties. Napster introduced into evi-
dence a report which indicated that sales were stimulated by Napster use. See id.
at 914. The Recording Industry of America submitted similar reports which
showed that the use reduced compact disc sales among college students and
raised barriers to the industry's entry into the market for digital downloading of
music. See id. The court chose to rely on the plaintiffs' reports, finding the report
relied on by Napster unreliable. See id.
36. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
37. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
38. The court declined to analyze all of these possible uses under the four fair use
factors, and focused primarily on space-shifting, presumably because space-shift-
ing was the only potential use which would not, by nature, displace the market
for the copyrighted works. See id. at 916-17. The court concluded that space-
shifting was not a commercially significant use because "the most credible expla-
nation for the exponential growth of traffic to the website is the vast array of free
MP3 files offered by other users-not the ability of each individual to space-shift
music she already owns." Id. at 916.
39. "Napster, Inc. maintains and supervises an integrated system that users must
access to upload or download files. Courts have distinguished the protection...
[the staple article of commerce doctrine] offers to the manufacture and sale of a
device from scenarios in which the defendant continues to exercise control over
the device's use." Id. at 917.
40. See id. at 920.
41. See id. at 919.
42. See id.
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ity because it provided the support services which made the infringing
possible.
4 3
Because the Recording Industry of America demonstrated a rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits, the district court granted a
preliminary injunction against Napster. As mentioned earlier, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the court's holdings regarding fair use and con-
tributory liability.44 Before analyzing whether this result was correct,
it is first necessary to discuss the development of the fair use doctrine
and the applicability of contributory liability in the online context.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine developed from common law. 45 It "strikes a
balance between the dual risks created by the copyright system;...
that although depriving authors of their monopoly may reduce their
incentive to create, granting authors a complete monopoly could re-
duce the creative ability of others."46 In codifying the common law
doctrine, Congress intended to restate the judicial application rather
than enlarge the doctrine in any way.47 The doctrine is intended to be
an "equitable rule of reason," as evidenced by the non-exclusive nature
43. See id. at 920 ("Napster, Inc. supplies the proprietary software, search engine,
servers, and means of establishing a connection between users' computers. With-
out the support services defendant provides, Napster users could not find and
download the music they want with the ease of which defendant boasts.").
44. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit used analysis simi-
lar to that of the district court in determining that Napster users were not en-
gaged in a fair use. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1015-20 (9th Cir. 2001). Specifically, it noted that the use was neither transform-
ative nor private and that it was likely to adversely affect the market for the
copyrighted work. See id. The court also generally agreed with the district
court's analysis of Napster's contributory liability: "e record supports the dis-
trict court's finding that Napster has actual knowledge that specific infringing
material is available using its system, that it could block access to the system by
suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material."
Id. at 1022. However, it did seem to take a more restrictive view of the level of
knowledge necessary to establish liability. See id. at 1021 ("[Albsent any specific
information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator can-
not be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the
system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.").
45. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), introduced the
doctrine in American courts. See Sonia Das, The Availability of the Fair Use De-
fense in Music Piracy and Internet Technology, 52 FED. CoMM. L.J. 727, 733
(2000).
46. Rebecca J. Hill, Pirates of the 21st Century: The Threat and Promise of Digital
Audio Technology on the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
311, 323 (2000).
47. See Das, supra note 45, at 734; accord H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
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of section 107.48 Nonetheless, fair use inquiries usually rely on the
four fair use factors exclusively codified.49 Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 50 represents the Supreme Court's
first attempt to interpret the doctrine after its codification and much
of the discussion below relies on the language of Sony.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor, the purpose and character of the use,5 1 is the
touchstone of any fair use inquiry.5 2 While this factor provides
greater protection for non-profit rather than commercial uses, the
"crux of the... distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation
of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price."53
This recognizes that most secondary uses will involve some level of
monetary gain, whether direct or indirect.5 4 Congress did not intend
for the first factor to be wholly determinative of the fair use ques-
tion.5 5 However, Sony changed the traditional fair use analysis by
elevating the importance of the first factor.
In Sony, the owners of copyrights on television programs brought a
copyright infringement action against the manufacturers of home
videotape recorders. The copyright holders alleged that some mem-
bers of the public had engaged in direct infringement by using the
tape recorders to record work that had been aired on commercially
sponsored television. In addressing whether this "time-shifting" con-
stituted a fair use of the recorder, the Court stated, "[ilf [the recorders]
were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose,
48. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
49. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1125
(1990).
50. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1998).
52. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1111.
53. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
54. See W.LLzt F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRMLEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 422 (2d. ed.
1995).
55. The 1976 House Report explains:
The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-
"the purpose and character of the use"-to state explicitly that this fac-
tor includes a consideration of "whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for non-profit educational purposes." This amendment is not
intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on edu-
cational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activ-
ity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), quoted in PATRY, supra note 54, at 420 (emphasis
added).
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such use would be presumptively unfair."5 6 Because "time-shifting"
was a noncommercial home use, however, the use was presumptively
fair.5 7 This presumption could be overcome only by proving the use
could adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.58
Justice Blackmun dissented. He believed that the first factor was not
intended to protect purely consumptive uses. 59
Justice Blackmun's view has gained some acceptance since Sony.60
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,61 the publishers of sci-
entific and medical journals brought a copyright infringement action
against Texaco, challenging Texaco's unauthorized replication of copy-
righted articles for use by its researchers. Texaco used the copies for
laboratory research activities and future reference. In holding that
the first factor weighed against fair use, the Second Circuit noted that
the use was not "transformative"62 because the secondary use had no
independent productive value.6 3
In a case decided around the same time as Texaco, the Supreme
Court backed away from the per se rule created in Sony. In Campbell
56. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 451.
59. "Purely consumptive uses are certainly not what the fair use doctrine was de-
signed to protect, and the awkwardness of applying the statutory language to
time-shifting only makes clearer that the fair use doctrine was designed to pro-
tect only uses that are productive." Sony, 464 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun, J. dissent-
ing). The majority opinion disagreed with Blackmun's argument:
The distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses may be
helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative.
Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a
stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker
game, the question is not simply two-dimensional.... Copying for com-
mercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for per-
sonal enrichment. But the notion of social 'productivity' cannot be a
complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who copies to prepare lec-
ture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the
sake of broadening his personal understanding of his speciality.
Id. at 455 n.40.
60. See Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair
Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REv. 677, 705-12 (1995).
61. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
62. The Second Circuit borrowed the term "transformative" from the lower court's
opinion. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). The lower court's opinion was written by Judge Leval, who introduced the
term "transformative" in his 1990 law review article. See Leval, supra note 49, at
1105.
63. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 923. The court noted, "the first factor favors
the publishers ... the dominant purpose of the use is a systematic institutional
policy of multiplying the available number of copies of pertinent copyrighted arti-
cles by circulating the journals among employed scientists for them to make cop-
ies, thereby serving the same purpose for which additional subscriptions are
normally sold." Id. at 924-25 (emphasis added).
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v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.64 the copyright holder of the song "Pretty
Woman," Acuff-Rose Music, sued the rap music group 2 Live Crew for
copyright infringement based on 2 Live Crew's marketing and sale of a
rap parody also entitled "Pretty Woman." 2 Live Crew countered that
the parody was a fair use of the original song. The Supreme Court
noted that the general question to ask under the first fair use factor is
"vhether the new work merely 'supersedes the objects' of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the
new work is 'transformative." 65 Thus, while under Sony the use
would have been presumptively unfair because it was commercial in
nature, the use was fair in Acuff-Rose Music because it altered, and
did not compete with, the original work. The Supreme Court went on
to state, "the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use."66 The Court reasoned that because the
parody had transformative value, the court of appeals erred in con-
cluding that the commercial nature of the use rendered it presump-
tively unfair.
Transformative use analysis seemingly implicates two different
types of uses: 1) uses which produce a new work and 2) uses which
benefit society.6 7 Courts have defined transformative value both
ways,6 8 but most courts have favored the first definition.6 9 While it is
difficult to draw any clear conclusions regarding the first factor, courts
clearly scrutinize the commercial nature of the use more closely, and
will look at whether the use has independent productive value, where
the use is for purely entertainment purposes. 70
64. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
65. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 579.
66. Id.
67. See Lape, supra note 60, at 702-12.
68. Compare Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 923 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The 'transforma-
tive use' concept... assesses the value generated by the second use .... To the
extent that the secondary use involves .. .an untransformed duplication, the
value generated by the secondary use is little or nothing more than the value that
inheres in the original.") with Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 478 (stating that productive use means use "resulting in some ad-
ded benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's work. The
fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works to be used for 'socially laudable
purposes.'") (Blackmun, J. dissenting)).
69. See Lape, supra note 60, at 707.
70. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 426.
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2. Nature of Copyrighted Work
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,71 looks at
two aspects of the work: "whether it is published or unpublished and
whether it is informational or creative."72 The published-unpublished
dichotomy recognizes the strong interest in giving the author of the
copyrighted work the right of first publication, 73 while the distinction
between informational and creative works recognizes copyright law's
strong interest in the stimulation of creative work for public
consumption. 74
Prior to the codification of the fair use factors, the factual nature of
the copyrighted work was used to justify writers' practice of using ex-
cerpts from copyrighted works in order to create secondary historical
and biographical works.75 Courts justified the use of these "facts" be-
cause of the public's interest in the development and distribution of
the secondary works.7 6 Thus, even the copying of primarily informa-
tional material traditionally was denied a fair use defense if the secon-
dary use would not serve a socially laudable purpose.
Today, the second factor rarely figures prominently in fair use
analysis. 7 7 Courts find it difficult to apply because even primarily in-
formational materials contain some element of creative expression,
and it is difficult to see why this expression requires any less protec-
tion than that given to wholly creative works.78 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has clearly indicated that first factor justification takes
precedence over the protection of creative expression.79
The second factor becomes important primarily where a work is
unpublished and the potential market for the work is harmed by the
71. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1998).
72. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
73. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)
(noting "[tihe right to first publication encompasses not only the choice whether
to publish at all, but also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to
publish a work").
74. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1117.
75. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966).
76. See id.
77. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1116 (noting that the second factor has been "only
superficially discussed and little understood").
78. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 505-06.
79. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1993) ("We agree... that
the ... original's creative expression ... falls within the core of the copyright's
protective purposes. This fact, however, is not... likely to help much in separat-
ing the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies
almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.") (citation omitted).
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secondary use.8 0 However, most of the concerns of the second factor
can be addressed through an analysis of the third and fourth factors.SX
Encompassing these concerns within the other factors is a better ap-
proach than trying to separate fact from creativity, given that the line
is often blurred.8
2
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the work used,
8 3
looks at the percentage of the work copied and whether that portion is
at the "heart" of the copyrighted material.84 Thus, the third factor has
both a qualitative (what part was taken) and a quantitative (how
much was taken) aspect. The qualitative aspect is interrelated with
the first fair use factor, as justification under the first factor may de-
pend on whether the "heart" of the original is taken. The quantitative
aspect is interrelated with the fourth fair use factor because the larger
the amount of copyrighted work copied, the more likely the use will
adversely affect the market for the original. Early decisions seem-
ingly placed more emphasis on the quantitative aspect by holding that
copying a work in its entirety could never constitute a fair use.8 5
Sony changed the traditional notion that wholesale copying pre-
cluded a fair use defense. Time-shifting obviously involved recording
the copyrighted work in its entirety because its whole purpose was to
allow the viewer to watch the program in its entirety at a different
80. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 505 ("Outside of unpublished works, this factor typi-
cally receives little attention."). The second factor figured prominently in the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539 (1985). In that case, the primary work was unpublished and the
copyright holder lost a prepublication excerpt contract when the work was appro-
priated by an unauthorized user. In holding that the second factor weighed
against the infringer, the Court stated, "a fair use doctrine that permits extensive
prepublication quotations from an unreleased manuscript without the copyright
owner's consent poses substantial potential for damage to the marketability of
first serialization rights in general." Id. at 569.
81. For example, a proper inquiry under the third factor should ask whether the es-
sence of the copyrighted work was appropriated by the secondary user. See dis-
cussion infra Part I.A.3. If the work is primarily factual, then the work has no
"essence" and does not deserve to be protected. Furthermore, where creative ex-
pression is taken and reproduced for use as a market substitute, the secondary
use will be more likely to harm the market than in a situation where factual
items are copied.
82. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 506 ("[A] broad rule permitting more generous fair
use of all factual works than all fictional works should be avoided in favor of a
case-by-case approach.").
83. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1998).
84. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65
(1985).
85. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); see generally
18 Az i. JuR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 86 (1985).
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time. While this traditionally would have precluded a fair use de-
fense, the Court in Sony found that it had no effect, reasoning that
"timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge."8 6 Thus, after
Sony, wholesale copying does not preclude a fair use defense if such
copying is necessary given the purpose of the use.8 7 Sony effectively
places primary emphasis on the qualitative aspect of the third factor.
The Supreme Court again focused on the importance of a qualita-
tive analysis of the amount taken in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises.8 8 In that case, Nation magazine was given the
unpublished memoirs of President Ford. Ford had contracted with
Harper & Row and given them the exclusive right to license prepubli-
cation excerpts. Harper & Row had in turn negotiated a prepublica-
tion licensing agreement with Time magazine. Nation scooped Time
and produced a 2000 word article, at least 300 words of which were
verbatim quotes taken from the manuscript. In arguing that the arti-
cle was a fair use of the manuscript, Nation noted that it had taken a
quantitatively insignificant portion of the copyrighted work. The Su-
preme Court disagreed, holding that the amount taken was significant
because the quoted passages represented the "distinctive expression"
of Ford.89
The emphasis on the quantitative aspect of the third factor is
proper given that a bright line rule regarding permissible quantity
would result in the unnecessary protection of some works which do not
merit protection, and would leave other works which deserve protec-
tion outside the scope of fair use.9 0 However, the greater the trans-
formative justification for the use the less important the third factor
becomes.
4. Effect Upon Potential Market or Value
The fourth factor, the effect upon potential market or value, has
traditionally been given the most weight. 91 This is because a secon-
86. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
87. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding where total copying was necessary to carry out purpose of reverse engi-
neering software fair use defense was not precluded); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1380 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (holding where Internet Service Provider had to copy copyrighted material
in its entirety in order to function as a service provider, fair use defense was not
precluded).
88. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
89. Id. at 565.
90. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1122.
91. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 566. But see Leval, supra note 49, at 1124 (argu-
ing "[t]he fact that the secondary use does not harm the market for the original
gives no assurance that the secondary use is justified").
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dary use which has a de minimus effect on the market for the primary
work presumably will not effect the author's creative incentive. The
importance of this factor illustrates that copyright is not a right inher-
ent in authorship; otherwise, this factor would be irrelevant.
9 2
The copyright holder need not show actual harm. Rather, it must
only be shown that some "meaningful likelihood of future harm ex-
ists." 93 In Sony, the Court held that when the secondary use is com-
mercial, this harm is presumed.9 4 However, others roundly criticized
this presumption and the Court later softened its approach.9 5 This
step back was necessary as it is easy to imagine situations where a
commercial use is not competing directly with, and therefore does not
affect, the market for the primary work.
96
Proof of actual harm to the present market will necessarily tip the
scales in favor of the copyright holder because it will generally reduce
the author's creative incentive. However, such situations are rare.9 7
Thus, fourth factor inquiries generally require a delineation of the
scope of the future market. For example, in Sony the copyright hold-
ers were unable to convince the Supreme Court that any potential for
future harm from time-shifting existed. The Court reached this result
in part because the record indicated that the copyright holders actu-
92. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1124.
93. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (stat-
ing that "[a] challenge to a... use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work").
94. See id.
95. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1993), the Court stated:
No "presumption" or inference of market harm that might find support
in Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplica-
tion for commercial purposes. Sony's discussion of a presumption con-
trasts a context of verbatim copying of the original in its entirety for
commercial purposes, with the noncommercial context of Sony itself
(home copying of television programming). In the former circumstances,
what Sony said simply makes common sense: when a commercial use
amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly "su-
persede[s] the objects" (citation omitted) of the original and serves as a
market replacement for it.... But when... the second use is transform-
ative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may
not be so readily inferred.
Id. at 591.
96. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 565 ("While a commercial use, by virtue of its nexus
to the marketplace, may be more likely to cause economic harm than a nonprofit
use, this will not always be the case. Some commercial uses may cause no harm
at all; some nonprofit uses may have a far more devasting impact than a commer-
cial use.").
97. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985)
("Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of
actual damage.").
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ally benefited from increased access to television programming.9 8 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority
had defined the market too narrowly:
The Court has struggled mightily to show that VTR use has not reduced the
value of the Studios' copyrighted works in their present markets .... The de-
velopment of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced by the
Studios. That market consists of those persons who desire to view television
programs at times other than when they are broadcast, and who therefore
purchase VTR recorders to enable them to time-shift.... The Studios are
entitled to share in the benefits of that market.... Respondents therefore can
show harm... simply by showing that the value of their copyrights would
increase if they were compensated for the copies that are used in the new
market. 9 9
Thus, while the majority in Sony looked at the future harm in
terms of present markets, Justice Blackmun's dissent was more for-
ward-looking. Neither approach is wholly satisfying. Restricting the
inquiry to future harm to present markets punishes the author who
may be unable to exploit the new market because of high barriers to
entry.OO However, when the future market is defined too broadly the
fair use doctrine loses its teeth, given that an unexploited derivative
market always theoretically exists.1 0 1
Most courts focus fourth factor analyses on whether the secondary
use is becoming a market substitute for the original.10 2 Courts should
not make the inquiry in isolation; instead, they should look at the po-
tential cumulative effect on the market.1 03
98. The Supreme Court relied on the district court's findings in this regard. The dis-
trict court found that the Nielsen Ratings system was able to include time-shift-
ers within its live audience measurements. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 453 n.36
(quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 466
(C.D. Cal. 1979)). The district court also found that the rerun market would not
be harmed:
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original tele-
vised material and that the more people there are in this original audi-
ence, the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing
practices, including the success of syndication, show just the opposite.
Today, the larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the
price plaintiffs can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There
is no survey within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun
audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any
event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may
increase and, given market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather
than harm them.
Id. at 453 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. at 468).
99. Sony, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 558.
101. See id. at 557-58.
102. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1125.
103. The Supreme Court has noted, "[ilsolated instances of minor infringements, when
multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright that
must be prevented." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
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While it is difficult to draw firm rules from judicial fair use analy-
sis, the first and fourth factors seem to be of primary importance. The
second and third factors generally come into play as extensions of
these two factors.
B. Contributory Copyright Infringement
Contributory infringement consists of two elements: 1) knowledge
and 2) contribution.1 0 4 Actual knowledge is not required. The defen-
dant need only have reason to know that direct infringement is occur-
ring.i0 5 There is little case law dealing with contributory liability in
cyberspace.O6 However, courts that have dealt with the issue have
done so using the traditional model.
1 0 7
Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,108 while not involving the In-
ternet, has played a key role in the analysis of contributory liability in
cyberspace. In Fonovisa, the copyright holders for musical recordings
sued the operators of a swap meet for infringement based on sales of
counterfeit recordings by independent vendors at swap meets.i0 9 The
swap meet supplied parking, conducted advertising, retained the right
to exclude vendors for any reason, and charged an admission fee for
customers entering the meet.' 0 There was no dispute regarding the
operator's knowledge of the infringing activity, as the local police de-
partment had seized counterfeit recordings from the swap meet in pre-
vious years and letters had been sent from the police department to
the swamp meet operators."' In holding that the operators had ma-
terially contributed to the infringement, the court noted that the in-
fringing activity could not have occurred without the swap meet
structure itself."i 2 It stated, "[Providing the site and facilities for
539, 569 (1985) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-473, at 65 (1975)) (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted).
104. See supra text accompanying note 30.
105. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
106. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEo. L.J. 1833,
1840 (2000).
107. See Michelle A. Ravn, Note, Navigating Terra Incognita: Why the Digital Mil-
lenium Copyright Act Was Needed to Chart the Course of Online Service Provider
Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 755, 772 (1999).
108. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
109. See id. at 260-61.
110. See id. at 261.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 264 (stating that "it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take
place in the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by
the swap meet. These services include, inter alia, the provision of space, utilities,
parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers.").
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known infringing activity is sufficient to establish contributory
liability."13
Courts have applied the reasoning of Fonovisa in the Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) context.1 1 4 However, some courts have taken a
more restrictive approach and have attempted to lessen the potential
liability of ISPs by imposing a higher knowledge requirement before
subjecting them to contributory liability.
For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc.,1i5 copyright holders brought an in-
fringement action against the operator of a computer bulletin board
service and an ISP for copyright infringement committed by a sub-
scriber to the bulletin board service. The copyright holder, once it be-
came aware of the copyright infringement, had asked both the ISP
and the bulletin board service to remove the infringing material. The
ISP argued that it did not have the knowledge necessary to support
contributory liability because it did not know the subscriber planned
to infringe when it signed its lease with the bulletin board service and
it did not know the subscriber would infringe prior to his postings.
The ISP also argued that it was unable to screen postings before they
were made, and it was difficult to determine whether copyright regis-
trations were valid or whether the use was fair once it had notice of
the alleged infringement.11 6
The court, in holding that a question of fact existed as to whether
the ISP knew or should have known about the infringement after the
receipt of the letter, declined to treat the ISP as a mere lessor of prop-
erty.1 1 7 However, the court recognized the substantial burden that
would be placed on service providers if knowledge were to be imputed
in all cases:
Where a [bulletin board service] operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of copy-
right notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to provide the nec-
essary documentation to show that there is a likely infringement, the
operator's lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and there will be no
liability for contributory infringement for allowing the continued distribution
of the works on its system.1 1 8
113. Id.
114. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
bulletin board service liable where it provided, monitored, and operated the bulle-
tin board service software, hardware, and phone lines necessary for the users to
upload and download games).
115. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
116. See id. at 1373.
117. Id. at 1373-74 (noting that a service provider "not only leases space but also
serves as an access provider, which includes the storage and transmission of in-
formation necessary to facilitate [the subscriber's] postings").
118. Id. at 1374.
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The court further noted that the contribution element had been es-
tablished.119 In doing so, it relied on the fact that the ISP allowed all
postings to be distributed on the Internet automatically while main-
taining control over the system's use.120
As the preceding discussion indicates, the body of case law dealing
with the contributory liability of ISPs remains in its infancy. It is un-
clear whether courts will fashion rules on an ad hoc basis or will in-
stead rely on traditional contributory liability principles in resolving
these issues.
C. Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
Sony also introduced the staple article of commerce doctrine as an
affirmative defense to a claim of contributory copyright infringement.
Rooted in patent law, the doctrine protects the manufacturer of a "sta-
ple article of commerce" if the product has substantial noninfringing
uses. 121 It primarily seeks to disable the monopoly holder from ex-
tending the monopoly to the point of frustrating commerce and harm-
ing the public.122
In Sony, the Supreme Court held that private, non-commercial
time-shifting was a commercially significant noninfringing use of the
Betamax recorder.1 2 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied in
part on the trial court's finding that a substantial number of copyright
holders did not object to the practice of time-shifting.124 Furthermore,
119. See id. at 1375.
120. The court stated:
Providing a service that allows for the automatic distribution of all
Usenet postings, infringing and noninfringing, goes well beyond renting
a premises to an infringer.... [I]t is fair, assuming Netcom is able to
take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs' copy-
righted works, to hold Netcom liable... where Netcom has knowledge of
... infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of [the
subscriber's] purpose of publicly distributing the postings.
Id. at 1375 (citations omitted).
121. The Patent Code provides:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in prac-
ticing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such a patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp. lV 1998) (emphasis added).
122. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912) ("[A] sale of an article which
though adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a con-
tributory infringer. [A rule to the contrary] would block the wheels of
commerce.").
123. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
124. The Court noted:
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the plaintiffs in the action owned the copyrights to only a small per-
centage of television programs.' 25 Because the Supreme Court found
that time-shifting was the primary use of the recorders in Sony, it did
not provide any test for determining when a noninfringing use is
"commercially significant."126
Cases decided in the aftermath of Sony have taken a restrictive
approach to the doctrine. In A & M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah 127 re-
cord companies brought a copyright infringement action against a
seller of blank audiotapes and duplicating equipment used by counter-
feiters of copyrighted audiotapes. The defendant argued that he could
not be liable for the infringement committed by the counterfeiters be-
cause the equipment could be used for legitimate, noninfringing
uses.12 8 The court declined to apply the staple article of commerce
doctrine because the products were specifically manufactured for
counterfeiting activity,1 29 were not capable of "substantial" nonin-
fringing uses,' 30 and were not released into the stream of commerce
without any intervention on the part of the defendant.' 3 '
It is unclear how the doctrine relates to the provision of Internet
service in cyberspace. It would seem, though, that a court could apply
the doctrine to a case based on the mere provision of Internet ser-
vice. i 3 2 In a situation where the provider has some level of awareness
If there are millions of owners of [Betamax's] who made copies of tele-
vised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such
as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs
welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that
makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the
equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproduc-
tions of respondents' works.
Id. at 446. Of course, the holding also rested on the fact that the Court found
unauthorized time-shifting to be a fair use. See id. at 454-55.
125. See id. at 443.
126. See id. at 442 ("[Un order to resolve this case we need not give precise content to
the question of how much use is commercially significant.").
127. 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
128. See id. at 1456. The defendant testified that some customers used the cassettes
to record their own original works. See id. at 1456 n.5.
129. "Arguably, the Sony doctrine only applies to 'staple articles or commodities of
commerce,' such as VCR's, photocopiers, and blank, standard-length cassette
tapes. Its protection would not extend to products specifically manufactured for
counterfeiting activity, even if such products have substantial noninfringing
uses." Id. at 1456.
130. "[Allthough time-loaded cassettes can be used for legitimate purposes, these pur-
poses are insubstantial given the number of Mr. Abdallah's customers that were
using them for counterfeiting purposes." Id.
131. "Mr. Abdallah's actions went far beyond merely selling blank, time-loaded tapes.
He acted as a contact ... he sold duplicating machines ... he timed legitimate
cassettes for his customers ... and he helped to finance some of his customers."
Id. at 1457.
132. See Yen, supra note 106, at 1873-74 ("Sony seems fully applicable to the provision
of Internet service.").
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that infringement is occurring, however, the applicability of the staple
article commerce doctrine is unclear.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Napster Users Were Not Engaged in Fair Use
The district court's holding that Napster users were not engaged in
fair use when they downloaded and uploaded songs in the Napster
system was consistent with the spirit of copyright law.
1. Use Was Not Wholly Private and Had No Transformative
Value
Under this prong, Napster basically argued that since Napster
users did not use the copyrighted material for financial gain, but in-
stead for private consumption, the use was justified.133 While at first
glance this might seem to follow logically from Sony, the argument
was flawed because Sony relied on questionable principles and Nap-
ster represented an expansion of Sony.
The reasoning of Sony marked a seemingly large break from tradi-
tional applications of the fair use doctrine by placing primary empha-
sis on the commercial nature of the use. It is unclear where the
deference to private use originated.' 3 4 Justice Stevens' original draft
of what became the majority opinion did not rely on fair use, but on
the idea that private copying was not an infringement of exclusive
rights at all.13 5 Justice Stevens argued that three values dictated
finding the practice lawful:
(1) privacy interests, (2) the principle of fair warning to millions of home copi-
ers, and (3) the economic interest in not imposing substantial retroactive fines
on an entrepreneur who has successfully developed a new and useful product,
"particularly when the evidence ... indicates that the copyright holders have
not yet suffered any actual harm."
1 3 6
None of these three values were traditionally a concern of fair use.
While the Court may have ultimately decided Sony correctly, the
133. See Appellant Napster, Inc.'s Opening Brief at 34-35, A & M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, Inc., 2001 WL 115033 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) [herein-
after "Brief"].
134. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Be-
hind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUm.-VLA J.L. & ATs
427, 450 (1993) (noting that there was no communication among the Justices re-
garding the presumption issue).
135. See id. at 433 (noting that the "central question for Justice Stevens was whether
the making of a single copy of any copyrighted work for a private, noncommercial
use is a copyright infringement").
136. Id. at 433 (quoting Letter from Associate Justice John Paul Stevens to Associate
Justice Harry A. Blackmun at 4-5 (Jan. 24, 1983)).
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Court used flawed analysis.13 7 The Court let equity get in the way of
its reasoning, something recognized by Justice Blackmun in his
dissent.138
Fair use inquiries ask whether the use is justified in light of the
principles of copyright law. 13 9 That is, whether the stimulation of cre-
ative endeavors for the public good will be frustrated by allowing the
use to continue. The four fair use factors all play a role in determining
whether a use is justified.
The Supreme Court has recognized this and has backed away from
the per se rule created in Sony when a copyrighted work is put to a
transformative commercial use.14 0 It should be willing to step away
from the other leg of the presumption as well.141
The transformative nature of the use should be at the center of
inquiries under the first factor, especially in situations where the use
is not wholly private.14 2 Historically, courts looked at whether the in-
fringing use had independent productive value. 14 3 Thus, the fair use
statute contains the preamble, "the fair use of a copyrighted work...
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright."144 These uses are transformative
137. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 244-51. Patry notes, "The contributory infringement
claim should have been dismissed without reaching fair use.... Regrettably,
though, fair use was reached and was subsumed as part of the contributory in-
fringement analysis as a basis for concluding that the Betamax was capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses." Id. at 244. He goes on to argue
that the Court should have affirmed the lower court's ruling (holding Sony con-
tributorily liable): .[Ifthe Court had affirmed, Congress could have acted quickly
to provide an exemption for time-shifting, without causing harm to the fair use
doctrine." Id. at 245.
138. "It may be tempting.., to stretch the doctrine of fair use so as to permit unfet-
tered use of this new technology in order to increase access to television program-
ming. But such an extension risks eroding the very basis of copyright law, by
depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of their incentive
to create." Sony, 464 U.S. at 480-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1116.
140. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1993).
141. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[F] [5] [b] [i] (2000) (stating that a reappraisal of the issues in Sony is not
foreclosed).
142. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1111 (noting that "the answer to the question of
justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use
is transformative").
143. See, e.g., Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (tKB. 1785) ("[We must
take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not
be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of
the arts be retarded.") (quoted in Sony, 464 U.S. at 479-80 n.33 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1998).
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in that they are socially beneficial. Since the codification of the fair
use doctrine was not intended to enlarge pre-statute practice,
14 5 it is
difficult to understand how someone engaged in an unproductive in-
fringing use could have a tenable argument under the first factor. Be-
cause Sony represented such a marked departure from traditional fair
use analysis, courts should limit it to its facts in order for the fair use
doctrine to retain its vitality.
Napster clearly would have been an expansion of Sony. Sony was
concerned only with the private recording of public television pro-
grams by individuals for later, one time viewing in the home. The
parties did not raise the issue of the recording of cable television, or
the sharing or trading of tapes. 14 6 The Napster system, on the other
hand, depended on the sharing of MP3 files in order to survive.1 4 7
With approximately 10,000 MP3 files being shared per second through
Napster,148 Napster was thriving. Thus, Napster users were not en-
gaged in the same type of private use as Sony users.
Because Napster users did not engage in a wholly private use with
a potential for only de minimus harm,14 9 the transformative nature of
the use had to be examined. Here, Napster clearly failed. Music in
MP3 format does not differ in any meaningful way from music in CD
format.150 While Napster argued that the conversion to the MP3 file
format was transformative because it made the music more "servicea-
ble,"'151 wholesale copying into a more accessible format does not
transform the copyrighted work in a way contemplated by the fair use
doctrine. If convenience was the concern, then the copying of journal
articles by scientists for later use would clearly be transformative,1
5 2
145. See supra text accompanying note 47.
146. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 459 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Interestingly, there is some indication that a majority of peer-to-peer file sharing
service users only "take" from the service and do not share their own files. See
Marilyn A. Gillen, Study Reveals Gnutella To Be One-Way Street, BILLBOARD,
Sept. 2, 2000, at 68 (citing survey showing that 70% of Gnutella users share no
files of their own). This trend, if it continues, would signal the end ofpeer-to-peer
file sharing and would also make it easier for copyright holders to find and sue
the limited number of parties who are making copyrighted materials available for
download.
148. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
149. See discussion infra Part M-4-4.
150. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that transforming recordings to MP3 format "adds no 'new aes-
thetics, new insights and understandings' to the original"). Indeed, the CD-like
sound quality of music in MP3 format is what made it popular in the first place.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
151. See Brief, supra note 133, at 34-36 (omitting the second factor from discussion of
fair use).
152. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
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as would the repackaging of excerpts from copyrighted books into an-
thology form.15 3
2. The Copyrighted Work Was Creative in Nature
Napster never really argued that the second factor should weigh in
its favor.154 Its lack of emphasis on this factor was not surprising,
given that after Acuff-Rose Music the factor is of limited independent
significance if the secondary use is justified under the first factor.
In fact, the second factor clearly weighed against Napster. Napster
users downloaded and uploaded creative audio recordings. The re-
cordings did not result from mere collections of facts; rather, they were
the fruit of "money, time, manpower, and creativity."15 5 Users did not
merely copy a theme or idea; instead, they appropriated the entire ex-
pression of a creative work-precisely the type of work protected by
copyright law.15 6 Absent a transformative use, the fact that the work
was creative in nature should have weighed against Napster in the
fair use calculus.
3. Napster Users Took the "Whole" and "Heart" of the Work
The third factor merits little discussion. Napster users took the
quantitative "whole" of the copyrighted work because MP3 files con-
tain musical selections in their entirety.157 They also took the quali-
tative "heart" of the copyright holders' creative expression.158 In that
it was necessary given the purposes of the use, however, the factor
was of limited importance.
4. Napster Use Was Likely to Adversely Affect the Market for the
Copyrighted Work
The district court also correctly concluded that the fourth factor
weighed in favor of the copyright holders. The Recording Industry of
America argued that Napster harmed the market in two main ways:
1) a reduction in compact disc purchases by college students, and 2) an
increased barrier to entry in the digital download market.159 Napster
countered with evidence that the Napster service increased sales and
that the service would help the copyright holders enter the market
because it stimulated investment in the hardware and software
153. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)
154. See Brief, supra note 133, at 34-35.
155. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 908.
156. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1119.
157. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
158. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
159. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
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needed to obtain and play MP3 files.160 Without getting into a battle
of the experts, it seems likely that Napster use would have adversely
affected the market for the copyrighted work.
Again, there were substantial differences between the situation in
Sony and that of Napster. In Sony, the television programs that users
copied were already being distributed free to the public at large.lei
Time-shifting increased access to these programs, actually benefiting
the copyright holders in the long run.1 6 2 The Supreme Court pre-
sumed that the viewers would watch these recorded programs once
and then erase or tape over them. Indeed, the Court was not con-
cerned with "librarying," where recordings are saved for indefinite pe-
riod of time.16 3
Conversely, the copyright holders in Napster did not generally ben-
efit when their music, which users would have otherwise had to pay
for, was given away free in a permanent format and distributed to
millions of people. Musical recordings are, by nature, "libraried." In-
dividuals generally do not listen to music only once before disposing of
it. Because of the permanent nature of musical recordings, the secon-
dary use in Napster was more likely to "supercede the use of the origi-
nal" recordings and become a market substitute.' 6 4
Another significant difference between Napster and Sony was the
nature of the new market created by the secondary use. The plaintiffs
in Sony provided no evidence that the copyright holders had planned
on entering the video tape recording market.i 65 By contrast, copy-
right holders in Napster planned on, and indeed had taken steps to,
enter the digital audio format market.' 6 6 Clearly, the digital audio
format was a potential market which the copyright holders were capa-
ble of exploiting in the future.16 7 The recording industry lost potential
160. See id.
161. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984).
162. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 453 n.38 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.
of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 466 (1979)).
163. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 ("Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would result in 'not a great deal of
harm.'" (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. at 467)).
164. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1125 (quoting Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)); see also PATRY, supra note 54, at 560 (noting that
"[h] arm arising from the ability of the defendant's use to substitute for the plain-
tiffs work in the marketplace is the proper focus of the fourth factor").
165. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
167. See PATRY, supra note 54, at 558 ("A preferable approach is to give effect to the
plain meaning of the term 'potential' to include not only uses currently being ex-
ploited, but also uses that the copyright owner might have an interest in exploit-
ing in the future.").
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licensing revenues when Napster users were allowed to freely upload
and download the copyrighted music.168
The copyright holders in Napster should not have had their rights
defined on the basis of present technology. This would have ulti-
mately rendered their copyright protection worthless.16 9 The copy-
right holders were entering the digital audio format market; they
were just doing it on their own terms, which was completely within
their rights.170
Under traditional fair use analysis, the first, second, and fourth
factors weighed strongly against Napster. The district court was cor-
rect in denying Napster users a fair use defense.
B. Contributory Copyright Infringement
It was proper to hold Napster liable for contributory infringement
based on its users' conduct. Napster was created with the knowledge
that it would be used for infringing purposes, yet Napster took no
steps to prevent infringement from occurring.
1. Napster Had Reason to Know of the Infringing Conduct of
Its Users
The district court found that Napster may have had actual knowl-
edge of the infringement being committed by its users.17 1 Nonethe-
168. The court in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir.
1994), held that this loss of potential licensing revenues, in and of itself, was
enough to tip the fourth factor in favor of the copyright holder:
[lit is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a par-
ticular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use
factor when the means for paying for such a use is made easier. This
notion is not inherently troubling: it is sensible that a particular unau-
thorized use should be considered "more fair" when there is no ready
market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use
should be considered "less fair" when there is a ready market or means
to pay for the use.
Id. at 898.
169. Sony, 464 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting there is danger in "con-
fining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present technology so
that, as the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because of unfore-
seen technical advances").
170. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) ("[A] copyrightholder's [sic] 'exclusive' rights.., include the right, within
broad limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by refusing to
license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds
acceptable.").
171. The Recording Industry of America notified Napster of more than 12,000 infring-
ing files in the Napster system. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918. Addition-
ally, a document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker stated that
Napster needed to remain ignorant of users' real names and Internet Provider
addresses because "they are exchanging pirated music." Id. The same document
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less, Napster argued that because it did not have any knowledge
regarding specific acts of infringement, but rather only general knowl-
edge that infringement was likely occurring, the court could not im-
pose liability.' 72 Essentially, Napster argued that constructive
knowledge, which generally suffices to establish contributory liability,
should have been replaced with an actual knowledge requirement in
its case. Undoubtedly, Napster did not know what each individual
user was transferring through the Napster system. However, Con-
gress dealt with the issue and decided that traditional principles of
contributory liability should apply. Furthermore, Napster differed
significantly from a traditional ISP, so that imputing knowledge was
not unfair.
It would be unfair to hold an ISP liable for contributory infringe-
ment based on the mere provision of Internet service. While all ser-
vice providers presumably are aware that some infringing activity
occurs through their system,' 7 3 imposing liability in all cases where
infringing material passes through their system would impose a sub-
stantial supervisory burden on these providers, an unjust burden
given the socially beneficial purpose they serve.17 4 This is one of the
main reasons why Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (hereinafter 'DMCA"). While the DMCA is complex and a full dis-
cussion of its provisions is outside of the scope of this Note, some of its
provisions shed light on the protection it seeks to give ISPs.
Section 512 of the DMCA limits liability for ISPs engaged in four
types of activities: 1) transitory digital network communications, 2)
system caching, 3) user storage, and 4) information location.175 While
Napster argued that it was a transitory digital network, and therefore
was shielded from liability for contributory and vicarious infringe-
ment even if it had knowledge of the infringing activity,'7 6 Napster
stated that the RIAA would benefit from Napster because "we are not just mak-
ing pirated music available but also pushing demand." Id.
172. See Brief, supra note 133, at 48-50.
173. See Yen, supra note 106, at 1873-74.
174. See Scott Y. Pomeroy, Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts in
the Digital Domain: Copyright, Computer Bulletin Boards, and Liability for In-
fringement by Others, 45 EMoRY L.J. 1035, 1075-77 (1996) (discussing the bene-
fits the public receives from on-line services as justifying an actual knowledge
requirement before subjecting service providers to contributory liability).
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (Supp. 1999).
176. Section 512(a) limits liability "for infringement of copyright by reason of the pro-
vider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by
reason of the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of
such transmitting, routing, or providing connections," if five conditions are
satisfied:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction
of a person other than the service provider;
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was more likely an information location tool.' 7 7 An ISP engaging in
information location activities can limit its liability only if it:
(i) does not have actual knowledge or awareness that the material or activ-
ity is infringing;
(ii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to re-
move, or disable access to, the material;
(iii) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the ISP has the right and ability to control such
activity; and
(iv) upon notification of claimed infringement, responds expeditiously to re-
move, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity.178
This language indicates that actual knowledge of specific acts of
infringement is not required where the ISP in question provides infor-
mation location tools. Congress apparently believed that the contribu-
tory infringement of information location tools should be analyzed
under traditional principles. Any other interpretation would effec-
tively render the statute moot because it would limit liability only
where there is no liability in the first place.' 7 9 Since courts have his-
torically "defer[red] to Congress when major technological innovations
alter the market for copyrighted materials,"' 8 0 Napster's knowledge
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is car-
ried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the
material by the service provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material ex-
cept as an automatic response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of
such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than the an-
ticipate recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or net-
work in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for
a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, rout-
ing, or provision of connections; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without
modification of its content.
17 U.S.C. § 512(a). Napster's motion for summary judgment based on this provi-
sion was denied. See Napster, Inc. v. A & M Records, No. 99-05183, 2000 WL
573136 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000). Napster most likely did not fit within the provi-
sion because it routed information links, not the information to which the links
referred. See Berschadsky, supra note 10, at 777.
177. See Berschadsky, supra note 10, at 776-79.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. 1999).
179. But see Berschadsky, supra note 10, at 779 (arguing that Napster fit within the
provision because it did not have actual or constructive knowledge for purposes of
the statute). This argument, however, seems to ignore the fact that the purpose
of the provision is to limit liability once contributory and/or vicarious liability is
established. See Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicari-
ous Liability for Copyright Infringement Into the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1005, 1005 (2000) ("Title II of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998 purports to limit the liability of Internet service prov-
iders that have been found vicariously liable for copyright infringement.").
180. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
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should have been examined under general contributory infringement
principles and actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement should
not have been required before imposing liability.
Napster also had a different level of knowledge regarding infring-
ing activity than the typical ISP. While the typical service provider
has a financial incentive unrelated to any infringing activity which
occurs through it,181 Napster was created for the sole purpose of locat-
ing and downloading music, most of which was copyrighted. Napster,
although it was receiving no financial benefit from its service at the
time of suit, planned to eventually derive revenues from its service.' 8 2
It was called the fastest growing Internet application ever.18 3 The
only logical explanation for its growth was the attractiveness of free
music, both copyrighted and uncopyrighted. Napster knew this; it is
common sense. Since it would place a huge burden on copyright hold-
ers to prove valid copyrights in each and every case,18 4 a service pro-
vider should not be able to escape liability by cleansing its hands and
not supervising activity directly-especially where it created the ser-
vice for primarily infringing purposes. The policy reasons for protect-
ing ISPs were simply not present in Napster.
The fact that Napster may not have been able to differentiate be-
tween infringing and noninfringing users should have been a concern
only at the remedy stage, and not at the liability stage. Courts
"should not misconstrue copyright holders' rights in a manner that
prevents enforcement of them when, through development of better
techniques, an appropriate remedy becomes available."IS5 In any
event, if a proper remedy could not have been fashioned, Napster, not
the copyright holders, bore that burden. Thus, under the traditional
objective knowledge test, it is clear that the court should have im-
puted knowledge to Napster.
181. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Although Netcom gains financially from its
distribution of messages to the Internet, its financial incentive is unrelated to the
infringing activity and the defendant receives no direct financial benefit from the
acts of infringement.").
182. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
183. See Greenfield et al., supra note 27, at 62.
184. See Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (noting that "requir[ing] proof of
valid registrations would be impractical and would perhaps take too long to ver-
ify, making it impossible for a copyright holder to protect his or her works in
some cases").
185. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 494 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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2. Napster Materially Contributed to the Infringement
Committed by Its Users by Knowingly Providing a
Forum for Infringement
Using the reasoning of Fonovisa, it seems clear that Napster mate-
rially contributed to the infringing activity that occured through its
system. Like the swap meet operator in Fonovisa, it would have been
difficult "for the infringing activity to take place in the massive quan-
tities alleged without the support services provided by [Napsterl."186
Napster provided the software, search engine, servers, and index nec-
essary to locate and download music quickly and effectively.187 With-
out the Napster forum, Napster users could not have carried out the
copyright infringement on such a wide scale. This goes to the heart of
Napster's success, and is why Napster experienced such rapid growth.
Contribution to the whole process, rather than contribution to the in-
dividual acts of infringement, is the proper standard.i8s
In the online context, materiality logically should be satisfied once
the knowledge element is established. Indeed, the court in Religious
Technology Center held precisely that.19 Napster seemed to argue
that a service provider materially contributes to infringement only
when it receives a financial benefit from, and supervises, the infring-
ing conduct.1 90 However, this goes to vicarious liability rather than
contributory infringement.1 9 1 The doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment is not concerned with whether the party benefited from the ac-
tivity; rather, it is concerned with the propriety of holding one party
responsible for the acts of another. Courts dealing with the issue have
found that ISPs should bear the risk of loss when they continue to
provide service to a known infringer. This is especially true in Nap-
ster, where the service was created with the knowledge that it would
be used to facilitate infringement.
186. Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
187. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
188. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968)
(explaining that "mere quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test to de-
termine copyright liability.... Rather, resolution of the issue ... depends upon a
determination of the function that [the alleged infringer] plays in the total [repro-
duction] process").
189. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[Mt is fair, assuming Netcom is able to take simple
measures to prevent further damage to plaintiffs' copyrighted works, to hold
Netcom liable for contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge of Er-
lich's infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of Erlich's
purpose of publicly distributing the postings.").
190. See Brief, supra note 133, at 53.
191. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting
that "benefit and control are the signposts of vicarious liability").
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Napster had constructive knowledge of the infringing activities of
its users and allowed this use to continue. The district court correctly
held that the elements of contributory liability were established.
3. Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine Did Not Apply to
Napster Because Service was Used Primarily for
Infringing Activities and Napster Exercised
Control Over the Service
Napster arguably had actual knowledge of the infringement, which
would preclude the application of the staple article of commerce doc-
trine. 192 Even absent actual knowledge, however, the doctrine was
still inapplicable because any noninfringing use of Napster was com-
mercially insignificant and because Napster was not released into the
stream of commerce as a neutral product.
Of course, a resolution of the fair use issue in favor of Napster
would have ended the inquiry as to whether the service was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. However, given that the primary use
of Napster was infringing, other possible noninfringing uses had to be
examined.
Napster, and the amici filing briefs on its behalf,193 chose to look at
the Napster service and its noninfringing uses in broad terms.
194
When looking at the system as a whole, one could easily find substan-
tial noninfringing uses. However, this broad-based view of the service
failed because it did not look specifically at those aspects of the prod-
uct that facilitated the infringement. 195 A proper inquiry should have
192. See Berchadsky, supra note 10, at 772 (noting that doctrine applies only where
constructive knowledge is at issue).
193. Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the Digital Media Association, the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, the Consumer Electronics Association, and the Digital
Future Coalition (joint brief with the Computer & Communication Industry Asso-
ciation). See 7 No. 4 Andrews Intell. Prop. Litig. Rep. 5 (available on Westlaw).
194. The amici argued that the district court gave the "greatest weight to the initial
and most popular actual uses of the Napster technology to the detriment of later-
developed and potential future substantial uses." Id.
195. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (holding no substantial noninfringing use for infringing hard drive because
infringing aspect of the drive was separable and did not have any significant non-
infringing uses); see also NmmRI, supra note 141, § 12.04[A] [21 [b] (discussing the
necessity of asking whether the product is divisible). Nimmer poses an interest-
ing hypothetical: "What if an added feature can be purchased for a [VCR] that
deletes commercials from the taping of a program, thereby shifting Sony's bal-
ance-should the commercial squelcher be gauged on its own merits, or should
the enhanced [VCR] as a whole be judged as to 'commercially significant nonin-
fringing uses?" Id. Justice Blackmun put it more succiently: "[lf no one would
buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufac-
turer is purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropri-
ately imposed." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
491 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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been: Would anyone have used the service if it did not have search and
index functions which allowed for free, unlimited, anonymous access
to all types of MP3 files, both copyrighted and uncopyrighted, without
any safeguards in place to prevent infringement? While the service in
broad terms (peer-to-peer file sharing) was socially beneficial, the spe-
cific attributes of Napster were not.
Napster was created for infringing purposes and was simply trying
to back its way out of liability.1 96 Ex post facto creation of noninfring-
ing uses should have been ineffective to shield Napster from liability
because "[o]nly the most unimaginative manufacturer would be una-
ble to demonstrate that a[n] image-duplicating product is 'capable' of
substantial noninfringing uses."
19 7
Napster also differed from Sony in that Napster did not technically
release its service into the stream of commerce. Napster contracted
with its users and could (although it did so infrequently) police its ser-
vice.198 Napster played a key role in allowing the underlying "pirat-
ing" activity to occur.19 9
The staple article of commerce doctrine was designed to protect
manufacturers of neutral products, such as VCRs, typewriters, cam-
eras, and copying machines.200 These products do not infringe unless
the user makes them do so. The doctrine should be inapplicable where
the producer of the product in question enabled the infringing activity
to take place by failing to properly exercise control over the use of the
product once it became aware that infringing activity is taking place.
While the staple article of commerce doctrine may protect a typical
ISP, a provider like Napster does not deserve protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, current law is not entirely equipped to deal with copyright
issues in cyberspace. In the absence of specific directives from Con-
gress, courts should "take the Copyright Act... as [they] find it,"201
and "do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles
. . until the Congress legislates."202 Applying these traditional prin-
196. For example, Napster's New Artist Program (facilitating the distribution of un-
copyrighted music) was not launched until after the lawsuit was filed. See Nap-
ster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
197. Sony, 464 U.S. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
199. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
("[E]ven if Sony were to exonerate Mr. Abdallah for his selling of blank, time-
loaded cassettes, this Court would conclude that Mr. Abdallah knowingly and
materially contributed to the underlying counterfeiting activity.").
200. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 500 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists,
392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968)).
202. Id. (quoting Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 404 (dissenting opinion)).
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ciples to Napster, it is clear that Napster users engaged in direct in-
fringement and, consequently, it was proper to hold Napster liable for
such infringement.
When Napster is reduced to its simplest form, it is easy to see what
this case was truly about:
It's like each of them won one of those contests where you get turned loose in a
store for five minutes and get to keep everything you can load into your shop-
ping cart. With Napster, though, there's no time limit and everyone's a win-
ner-except the artist.... If you're not fortunate enough to own a computer,
there's only one way to assemble a music collection the equivalent of a Nap-
ster user's: theft.
2 03
Aaron Johnson
203. Copyright Issues and Digital Music on the Internet: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2000 WL 23831272 (statement of Lars Ulrich).
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